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FOREIGN LANGUAGES PUBLISHING HOUSE

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Speech Delivered
in the Political Committee
of the United Nations
General Assembly,
October 23, 1950

FOREIGN LANGUAGES PUBLISHING HOUSE
Moscow 1951

On September 20, the delegation of the U.S.S.R. submitted to the General Assembly proposals designed to eliminate the danger of a new war and to strengthen the peace and security of nations.

In a statement made in the General Assembly, the U.S.S.R. delegation has already indicated the basic motives which have induced the Soviet Government to propose that the fifth session of the General Assembly examine this question and adopt the Declaration on the subject submitted by the Soviet delegation. We also stressed how immense would be the importance of the adoption by the General Assembly of the Declaration we propose, which calls for vigorous and energetic measures to eliminate the danger of another war and to safeguard the peace and security of nations.

The adoption of such a Declaration would be of particular importance in the present world situation, in face of the war raging in Korea and in other areas of the Far East, and of the never-ceasing machinations of the fomenters of a new war that would menace the vital interests and the welfare of all mankind.

On the other hand, millions upon millions of labouring people are, with unparalleled insistence, raising their mighty voice in protest against the preparation of another war, and are demanding that the governments of their countries take vigorous and consistent measures

to safeguard peace, to eliminate the threat of another war and to ensure the security of the nations.

Now more than ever before, in the opinion of the Soviet delegation, the consistent fulfilment by the General Assembly of its tasks in the matter of defending peace acquires exceptional importance in the activities of the United Nations. The purpose of the proposals submitted by the Soviet Union delegation is precisely to ensure the carrying out of these tasks, which are set forth and defined in Chapter I of our Charter, dealing with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. It is precisely this idea of the struggle for peace that is the keynote of our draft Declaration. Its preamble stresses that the events now taking place in Korea and other parts of the Pacific confirm with renewed force how exceptionally important and urgent it is for the cause of peace and security of nations to unite the peace efforts of the five Powers who are the permanent members of the Security Council and who bear special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace.

There is no need to stress that the efforts of the permanent members of the Security Council for the safeguarding of peace are closely linked with the efforts of all other peace-loving states, medium and small, of all who are striving to avert the calamity of war, which would spell unspeakable misery and suffering for the peoples, of all who are striving to preserve and strengthen peace throughout the world by promoting friendly relations among the nations and their mutual cooperation in solving international problems.

In spite of the numerous obstacles standing in the way of strengthening peace and cooperation among nations, this is the path the Soviet Union is persistently and firmly following, in the knowledge and firm conviction that this fully accords with the hopes and aspirations of the Soviet people and of all other peace-loving

peoples, that it accords with the interests of all mankind.

Numerous facts and documents in the history of the Soviet state and its foreign policy bear witness that the Soviet Government has invariably and determinedly striven for peace and the promotion of international cooperation. These facts bear witness that the Soviet Government has throughout its existence, ever since the first day of the Great October Revolution, made tremendous efforts and displayed unfailing initiative for the accomplishment of its peaceful ends and for creating the conditions for the building of a socialist society, a socialist workers' and peasants' state. The Soviet people are absorbed in peaceful constructive labours, and nothing is farther from their thought than belligerent designs and warlike plans. To them war is abhorrent, and they are making gigantic efforts to remove the danger of another war and to guarantee peace and security, which are so essential to our people for the successful accomplishment of the majestic tasks of socialist construction. All the creative forces of the Soviet land and of our great people are concentrated on the attainment of peaceful ends. Our science and engineering are dedicated to the service of peace, of peaceful constructive labour. This too is the trend of development of all our Soviet industry, of all our Soviet economy.

Life in the Soviet Union is entirely imbued with the idea of peace and peaceful construction, and no matter what the warmongers may say, and how they may try to deceive the people by defaming the Soviet Union, we are convinced that there is no honest person to be found anywhere in the world who believes the slanderous fabrications that the Soviet Union harbours warlike designs against other states, against other nations.

Whatever efforts unscrupulous persons may make in furtherance of their own self-seeking interests to shake

the faith of the peoples in the Soviet policy of peace, by disseminating malicious fabrications and slanderous allegations regarding the Land of Socialism, they cannot obliterate from the minds of tens and hundreds of millions of common folk all over the world the firm conviction that it is the Soviet Union that is the bulwark of peace, its staunch and sincere champion, that the Soviet Union, as J.V. Stalin, the head of the Soviet Government, has said, is a country which is capable of pursuing, and is actually pursuing, a policy of peace, not pharisaically, but honestly and frankly, determinedly and consistently.

No attempt to gull people on this score can succeed, because no one will succeed in concealing his hostile designs against the Soviet Union by hysterically shouting that the Soviet Union considers it impossible for socialist countries and capitalist countries to live side by side in peace, and that the Soviet Union is supposedly not striving for cooperation and friendly relations with other countries, in particular, with countries belonging to a different social and political system.

All these hostile machinations against the Soviet Union are countered by numerous and convincing facts, by the over thirty years of history of the Soviet state, and by the whole trend and character of the peaceful Soviet foreign policy.

What, indeed, is the truth concerning the question that is so often raised at international conferences and, in particular, within the United Nations—the question whether it is possible for the U.S.S.R., a socialist country, and the countries of the capitalist system to live together in peace and cooperation? This question has already attracted considerable attention and has been broadly treated at earlier sessions of the General Assembly, although by some delegations it was treated incorrectly and in distortion of historical fact. But, apparently, this question has not yet been exhausted, inasmuch as

certain delegations have made attempts to revert to it at this session too. While desirous of avoiding repetition, I nevertheless consider it necessary, for my part, to dwell on this question too, and to recall certain important facts which throw full light on the matter.

Here are these facts.

In the interview he gave the first American labour delegation in 1927, J. V. Stalin pointed out that the existence of two antithetical systems—the capitalist system and the socialist system—did not preclude the possibility of agreements with capitalist states in matters pertaining to industry, trade and diplomatic relations.

J. V. Stalin said at this interview: "I think that such agreements are possible and expedient in conditions of peaceful development.

"Export and import are the most suitable bases for such agreements. We need machinery, raw materials (cotton, for example), semimanufactures (metallic, etc.); the capitalists need markets for such commodities. Here you have a basis for agreement. The capitalists need oil, timber, cereals, while we need markets for such commodities. Here you have a basis for agreement. We need credits; the capitalists need good interest on credits. Here you have another basis for agreement, this time in the line of credits, and it is moreover well known that Soviet agencies are the most punctual repayers of credits."

Much time has elapsed since then, and our needs have changed. There are many things we no longer need from the capitalist countries in the way of trade relations; nevertheless, trade relations have not lost their value; they have not lost their importance in the matter of strengthening international ties. I have recalled what the head of the Soviet Government said in 1927 to the American labour delegation chiefly in order to show how many are the opportunities—given the good will and the honest desire for real cooperation—for the establish-

ment and consolidation of international ties, which, in their turn, would help to consolidate the peace and security of nations.

In this interview, J. V. Stalin stressed that the Soviet Union was pursuing a policy of peace, and was prepared to conclude pacts of nonaggression with bourgeois states, was prepared to come to agreement on the question of disarmament, and so forth. Referring to the agreements which had been concluded at that time with other countries, J. V. Stalin, in this same interview he gave the American delegation, stated that we should like these agreements to be more or less enduring, pointing out, however, that "this, of course, depends not only on us but also on the other parties."

Being in favour of peaceful cooperation with other countries, even though they belonged to a different social, economic and political system, the Soviet Union secured an improvement of relations with a number of countries and the conclusion of a number of treaties with them on trade, technical assistance and so on, in spite of the fact that some countries, the United States of America, for example, at that time—and later too, for sixteen years—did not recognize the Soviet Union and wilfully refused to recognize it, resisting the demand of the American public and the progressive circles of other capitalist countries that it abandon its absurd policy of boycotting the young Soviet Republic.

Yet precisely at this time the Soviet Union, notwithstanding the boycott to which it was subjected by some of the capitalist countries, including such big ones as the United States of America, associated itself with the Kellogg Pact, signed protocols with other states along the lines of this pact and developed an active struggle for collective security. The Soviet Union took an active part in a number of conferences held at that time under the aegis of the League of Nations, beginning with the

twenties. It was no other than the Soviet Government that in February 1933 proposed that a definition of aggression and of the aggressor be adopted. Although it was supported in this initiative by many states, and although the majority in the Security Committee, which was composed of representatives of 17 states, in the main approved this proposal, it was nevertheless rejected by the conference, which was dominated by the representatives of the British and French governments of that time.

Nevertheless, pacts defining the aggressor were concluded by the Soviet Union with the majority of its neighbours in the West, and the South, including Finland and Poland, as well as with the countries of the so-called Little Entente. Then, too, pacts of nonaggression were concluded with these same neighbouring states, as well as with France and Italy.

The majority in the League of Nations resisted this trend of international policy for which the Soviet Union was energetically fighting, and rejected the Soviet Union's peaceful proposals. Nevertheless, overcoming all these obstacles, the Soviet Union persisted in this path of promoting peace, and, on its own initiative and supporting the initiative of certain other states, concluded treaties and agreements—which were of course not empty words, but practical deeds. This is what certain delegates do not appreciate when they reply to our proposals for peace, to the measures we propose for strengthening peace, with the invariable phrase: "Prove by deeds that these are not just words, but that you are really prepared to carry out these measures in practice."

Are not the facts I have just mentioned an eloquent refutation of all these attempts, by putting such questions, to escape the necessity of supporting the Soviet proposals, to torpedo the Soviet proposals, on the pretext, as

I have said, that these are only words, and by saying: "Show by your deeds how you intend to put these words and proposals of yours into actual practice."

Well, these facts I have cited show that Soviet words and proposals are invariably put into practice, into actual deed, provided these proposals receive even the slightest support from the other delegations, from the other states; provided these states evince an elementary desire actually to come to agreement on some real basis with the Soviet Union, with the Soviet Government.

Such was the peaceful Soviet foreign policy at that time. The years immediately preceding the Second World War and the years following it have provided numerous examples of the establishment—and not merely of proposals for the establishment—of friendly and business-like ties and relations with other states, undertaken on the initiative and thanks to the efforts of the Soviet Union.

The leaders of the Soviet state have declared time and again that the Soviet Union's foreign policy is based upon confidence in the inevitability and possibility of the prolonged coexistence of the socialist and capitalist systems, that peaceful cooperation is quite feasible and possible between the U.S.S.R. and all states that are prepared to reciprocate and conscientiously carry out the international obligations they assume.

When, in September 1946, J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., was asked by A. Werth, Moscow correspondent of the *Sunday Times*, whether, with the further progress of the Soviet Union towards Communism, the possibilities of peaceful cooperation between the Soviet Union and the outside world would not decrease, the head of the Soviet Government, J. V. Stalin, replied:

"I do not doubt that the possibilities of peaceful cooperation, far from decreasing, may even grow."

In that same year, 1946, J. V. Stalin was asked by Elliott Roosevelt whether it was possible for the U.S.A. to live peaceably side by side with a communist form of government like the Soviet Union's and with no attempt on the part of either to interfere with the internal political affairs of the other.

J. V. Stalin's reply was: "Yes, of course. This is not only possible. It is wise and entirely within the bounds of realization. In the most strenuous times during the war, the differences in government did not prevent our two nations from joining together and vanquishing our foes. Even more so is it possible to continue this relationship in time of peace."

In May 1948 J. V. Stalin reaffirmed that the Government of the U.S.S.R. considered that "in spite of differences in economic systems and ideologies, the coexistence of these systems and the peaceful regulation of differences between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. is not only possible but absolutely necessary in the interests of universal peace."

Well known, too, are J. V. Stalin's historic replies to the questions of Kingsbury Smith, European General Manager of the International News Service, in which the head of the Soviet Government said: "Naturally, the Government of the U.S.S.R. could cooperate with the Government of the United States of America in implementing measures aimed at the realization of a Pact of Peace and leading to gradual disarmament."

These words of the great leader of the Soviet Union define the whole trend of Soviet foreign policy, which unswervingly pursues objectives conforming with the fundamental interests of the Soviet people and of all peace-loving peoples.

These facts, it seems to me, should be quite sufficient to silence, at last, the calumniators—all those who have made it their profession to blacken and defame the Soviet

Union, its foreign policy, its sincerity, its earnest desire for cooperation in the interests of all peace-loving nations.

And what is the foreign policy of the United States of America? The facts show that the foreign policy of the United States is of quite a different character. Of a different character, too, is American diplomacy, which the head of the State Department, in a speech on February 16 called, by analogy with "total war"—"total diplomacy."

This definition in itself is enough to show quite clearly what U.S. diplomacy really is. In order to leave no doubt on this score, Mr. Acheson declared in this same speech that America's leaders were *against good-natured tolerance* in relations, say, with the Soviet Union, that allegedly "the only way to deal with the Soviet Union is to create situations of strength."

Mr. Acheson expressed the same idea, only in more developed form, on another occasion, when speaking of Soviet-American relations. Speaking of the foreign policy of the U.S.A., he said the following: "It has been our basic policy to build situations which will extend the area of possible agreement; that is, to create strength instead of the weakness which exists in many quarters. . . ." He further said that the whole purpose of the economic recovery program in Western Europe was to create strength instead of weakness, adding "that is the purpose of the arms program, that is the purpose of the point 4 program."

And so, if we analyze Mr. Acheson's statements—and there have been very many of them, I have cited only a few, and perhaps not sufficiently striking ones, but at any rate, it seems to me, they are clear enough—we shall find that the U.S. State Department—which of course is chiefly answerable for the foreign policy of the United States—as well as other responsible U.S. leaders, who, naturally, are also answerable for its foreign policy,

can only conceive of settling problems of foreign policy, can only conceive of foreign policy being conducted with the help of force, of pressure and dictation, with the backing of such solid arguments as armed forces—the army, the navy and the air fleet.

The significance of force in the foreign policy of the American Government is systematically stressed by U.S. political leaders in all their speeches, as if they were making a parade of it. This gives us every justification to say that force is the basis of the foreign policy of the entire Anglo-American bloc. I say Anglo-American bloc, although I realize full well that the decisive role in the matter belongs to the United States of America, whose lead is followed by Britain and France, to say nothing of other countries which, unfortunately, are economically very much dependent on the United States. It is not only U.S. leaders and statesmen who affirm that force is the main instrument and lever in the regulation of international relations; this viewpoint is repeated by the Ministers of other countries.

To judge, for instance, from what Mr. Bevin, the Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, says, this too is the trend of British foreign policy. The *New York Times* reported Mr. Bevin as having said the other day that since the strength of the West was growing there might again come a situation in which world problems could be settled by means of direct negotiations between the Great Powers.

What does this mean? It means that you can only negotiate with the Soviet Union when you feel you have the power in your hands. In other words, when states which intend to negotiate with the Soviet Union for the settlement of some or other unsettled international problem are armed from head to foot. It is obvious what the result may be of such an attitude towards states one wants to negotiate with, when one beforehand brandishes the

mailed fist and all the other requisites of one's "diplomatic" readiness for negotiations.

It follows from what Bevin says that force is the preliminary condition for the settlement of world problems, that they can be settled only by threatening to use armed force if one doesn't get one's way. These words express the real trend of the foreign policy of the Anglo-American bloc.

Referring to the discussion in the United Nations of the Anglo-American proposal on United Action for Peace—the second item on our agenda, which we have just disposed of—Mr. Bevin tried to make out that if the General Assembly is given the disposal of armed forces, this will facilitate the regulation of unsettled issues through negotiations with the states concerned. Thus, here too it is quite obvious that what he had in mind was the power factor, I would even say the factor of intimidation, of striking fear in the other side.

It need scarcely be said that a policy based on such principles is altogether reckless and futile, and still more so when applied to the Soviet Union.

Such arguments as armed force, or the threat of untoward consequences, can yield only negative results when employed in respect to the Soviet Union. Other partners should be chosen for such experiments; the Soviet Union is certainly not the appropriate partner for this.

Mr. Bevin dotted the i's and crossed the t's when he said that the British Government, while it retained its faith in the United Nations as a mechanism for the settlement of international disputes, deemed it desirable "to build up a position of strength by means of the North-Atlantic Treaty organization and similar measures."

Mention of the North-Atlantic Treaty in this connection is very significant, since the aggressive character of this treaty is pretty well known to all and requires no particular proof, although I shall not refuse, if any ob-

jections are offered to this, to bring proof of the correctness of my assertion.

In order to leave no doubt as to what Mr. Bevin had in mind with regard to the Soviet Union, attention should be drawn to that passage in his statement where he expressed the conviction that "before any good could come of such four-power talks, it was essential that the Western powers be strong." This statement of Mr. Bevin's attracted the attention of the press. For instance the *New York Times,* a paper you all know, when commenting on these words of Bevin's, recalled—and not without good reason—Churchill's statement to the effect that future developments would depend on how effectively Western diplomacy made use of the "breathing space" which, he claimed, the atomic bomb "still gives the West." Commenting on Bevin's speech, the paper said that "the only way to security lies in a recrudescence of the old military strength of Western Europe."

Can there be anything more shameful than to declare that the atomic bomb—that inhuman and barbarous weapon of mass annihilation—affords a "breathing space" between wars, in other words, to boost the atomic bomb as a means of defending peace, to depict this brutal weapon of death as a source of life! A more disgraceful spectacle it would be hard to imagine.

The cult of force, the cult of the atomic weapon, is proclaimed by the leaders of the Anglo-American bloc to be the prime mover in foreign relations, the principal lever, the backbone of the entire foreign policy of the U.S.A., Great Britain and the other members of the North-Atlantic bloc.

It is facts like these that show the character of the foreign policy of the U.S.A. and of its allies—Britain and France.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it is clear that the leaders of the Anglo-American camp are trying

to base their relations with that country, as well as with the People's Democracies, on force, and they want to make the degree of force—the armed force, let me stress—at their disposal the measure of the possibility of cooperating with the Soviet Union.

That force determines the whole trend of American foreign policy was confirmed in the speech Mr. Truman recently delivered in San Francisco. In this speech the President of the United States attempted to justify in some measure the present aggressive policy of America's ruling circles by trying to make out that it was a policy they were "compelled" to adopt. Nor was there any lack in this speech of anti-Soviet allegations, designed to conceal the real nature and character of this policy of frenzied armament building and instigation of a new war, which is in clear contradiction to their unctuous talk about peace.

And it is no chance accident that this speech contained a warning to the American people that a still greater burden of military expenditure awaited them, and that the United States, in Mr. Truman's words, "must devote more of its resources to military purposes, and less to civilian consumption."

Why, this is nothing but the old and well-known formula which originated in the camp of Hitler reaction—"guns before butter."

We know that the U.S. Senate Finance Committee has already approved a program envisaging increased taxation to a total of five billion dollars, which increases the individual income tax by an average of 16 per cent, and also increases other taxes, as of October 1 of this year.

In the face of these facts, what is the worth of the flowery talk about collective security and desire for peace, which Mr. Acheson said must be a "moral peace," one that will allow people to "unite in brotherhood"!

It is obvious that they use this flowery talk in order to conceal from their own people and the people of other countries the real meaning of U.S. foreign policy, which has chosen as its basic method the use of force against other states.

These facts are sufficient to show up the hypocrisy and falsity of the declarations of diverse leading personages in the Anglo-American camp of their willingness to co-operate with the Soviet Union. The fact alone that they make it a preliminary condition that the Soviet Union shall give proof that it really will pursue a peaceful policy, a policy of cooperation, shows that these declarations are not serious. One can, therefore, only regard these declarations as an attempt to cover over their own unwillingness to cooperate with the Soviet Union, or generally to cooperate with anyone for the furtherance of peace. They do not want any agreements with the Soviet Union, for they are afraid that such agreements would hinder the realization of their aggressive plans, conceived on an even larger scale than those which are already being carried out in certain parts of the world.

These declarations are only designed to mask their own violations of international agreements, and to facilitate their preparation for another war.

On the one hand, the responsible leaders of the United States, Britain and France, and of other states which are allied with them in a close political and military bloc, speak effusively of the importance of international cooperation, of the importance of unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council, of the need for all manner of consultations and agreements, of the need to remove differences and achieve agreed decisions, as required by the provisions and principles of the U.N. Charter; sometimes they even pass resolutions along these lines, as was demonstrated here the other day when the so-called "United Action for Peace" was discussed.

This is what we have on the one hand—fine speeches, and quite tolerable resolutions, as for instance, the resolution moved by Syria and Iraq, etc., united efforts, so to speak, for peace. But on the other hand we have open violation of obligations under international agreements and treaties already concluded by them, violations which are incompatible with the duty of promoting peace.

As an illustration of such violations of international agreements, on an extremely important question, I might point to the policy of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France vis-à-vis Germany, to their complete renouncement of the obligations laid upon them by the Potsdam Agreement. It will be recalled that at the previous session Dulles repeatedly asserted that there would be no return to Teheran or Yalta or Potsdam.

Having taken the line of partitioning Germany and bringing Western Germany within the orbit of their aggressive military plans, the governments of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France are now, as is evident from the statements of their Foreign Ministers of September 19 of this year, taking measures to re-create an army in Western Germany, to remilitarize Western Germany. This is a gross violation of the Potsdam Agreement; it is a renunciation of the Potsdam Agreement, under which the four Great Powers pledged themselves never to permit the remilitarization of Germany, never to allow Germany again to become a seat of uneasiness to the world, and to Europe in the first place, again to become a seat of war, as is the dream of the revanchist elements in Germany and the reactionary circles in the U.S.A., Great Britain and France that support them.

"These powers want a free hand in utilizing Western Germany, its man power and material resources, to further their own imperialist interests and to implement their strategic plans, behind which lurks the desire of U.S. ruling circles to establish their domination over the

world. On the pretext of terminating the state of war with Germany, they are endeavouring to prepare the ground for openly including Western Germany in the aggressive grouping known as the North-Atlantic alliance and definitely to convert Western Germany into an instrument for the furtherance of their aggressive strategic plans in Europe."

Such is the policy of the governments of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France towards Germany, as quite correctly defined in the passage I have just quoted from the Declaration of the Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Albania and Bulgaria, just concluded in Prague.

In the revival of a German, West-German, army the services are being enlisted of Halder, Guderian, Manteuffel and other Hitlerite generals. And it is intended to place this army at the service of the Anglo-American bloc. There are already in the Western zones of Germany and in the Western sectors of Berlin over 450,000 men serving in various formations which, under the guise of police forces, are actually army formations, with tank and artillery units. As a matter of fact, in the Western sectors of Berlin and the Western zones of Germany a regular West-German army, headed by former fascist officers and generals, already exists, operates and is being strengthened.

These facts incontrovertibly prove that the governments of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France—as is pointed out in the Prague Declaration of the Foreign Ministers of Eight States in connection with the New York three-Power conference on the remilitarization of Western Germany—have completely renounced the obligation they took upon themselves concerning the formation of a united democratic and peaceable German state.

Such is the foreign policy of the U.S.A. and Great

Britain. Its aims are aggressive, and involve the employment of the armed forces of Western Germany in Europe and of Japan in the Far East.

In order to impose their will, in order to succeed—as they think they will—in this policy, they are bent on arming from head to foot. For many years they banked on the atomic bomb—and lost out. Now they are banking on the hydrogen bomb. It may be said in advance: You will lose out here too, sirs.

But what should the United Nations do in these circumstances?

The path along which the representatives of the U.S.A. and Great Britain are trying to push the United Nations, the path of embroiling the U.N. member states in warlike ventures—which they sometimes succeed in doing, as we know from the case of Korea, from the Korean events—is a path fatal to the United Nations. It runs counter to its principles, its Charter. There is another path, and that is—not hypocritically and falsely, but sincerely and honestly—to cast aside belligerent plans, threats and attempts to intimidate one's partners with one's armed strength, and to reach agreement on unsettled issues on a basis of equality and mutual respect. It is a path of international agreements on mutually acceptable terms and conditions.

It must be remembered that peace cannot be strengthened if, parallel with talk about peace from the platforms of all sorts of international organizations, behind the scenes, in the war chancelleries and general staffs, feverish work is to proceed on the drawing up of plans for attack upon those with whom it is proposed to negotiate.

We do not shut our eyes to the difficulties that stand in the way of the struggle for peace and the promotion of peaceful cooperation among nations. We know that these difficulties are due to such important circumstances, among others, as the one of which I have just spoken—

the trend of the foreign policy of certain countries, in the first place, of the United States of America, which stands at the head of a reactionary grouping of states, a policy which has nothing in common with peaceable aims.

We know that the United Nations, which we regard as a weighty instrument for peace, can play a very effective role in the struggle for peace. It can do so, if it is strong enough to counteract tendencies that are incompatible with tendencies to peace and a peaceful policy, if it is in a position to counteract adventurist plans of every description, and, by its active resistance, to bring about the collapse of these plans. But for this it is necessary that the United Nations shall stand firmly on its feet and possess sufficient prestige and influence. But the strength of the Organization is not built up by attempts to shatter it, to undermine the foundations on which it stands, to deprive it of the possibility of acting in accordance with the laws which have been prescribed for it, and by which it must be guided in order to act—because outside these laws it cannot act.

What, then, shall we say of the policy which is being stubbornly pursued vis-à-vis the United Nations for months, and perhaps for years, and which is aimed at violating the Charter and its principles, at undermining the Charter, at undermining the most responsible and important organs of the United Nations, such as the Security Council, with the help of those fallacious, illegal and unjustified resolutions which are being introduced as if to demonstrate over and over again a complete contempt for the international obligations one has assumed.

Such gross violations have already become a common thing here. They occurred when the Security Council examined the question of American aggression in Korea and the question of representation of the Chinese People's Republic in the United Nations, and again just now, in the Political Committee, during the examination of the

so-called United Action for Peace, sections C and D of which grossly violate the Charter and are incompatible with the aim of strengthening the United Nations. And if the United Nations is not strengthened, it is vain to talk of strengthening peace. For peace is strengthened by means of organized efforts, and organized efforts are made by organizations; and if these organizations are reduced to nonentities, no efforts on their part can have any positive effect.

It should be remembered that every blow at the United Nations is a serious blow at the cause of peace, because the strength and power of the United Nations is a most important factor in the struggle for strengthening peace and for the promotion of international cooperation.

Permit me now to pass directly to our proposals.

Right at the beginning of this session of the General Assembly, in the general discussion, after the Soviet Union delegation had presented its proposals, some of the delegations came forward with objections to the Declaration submitted by the Soviet delegation which we have entitled "Declaration on Eliminating the Danger of a New War and Strengthening the Peace and Security of Nations."

These delegations greeted our proposal for a Declaration with their customary spirit of hostility to the Soviet Union. As on similar occasions at previous sessions, they endeavoured to set aside the examination of our question by substituting another for it. It is to be expected that a similar attempt will be made here. They want to substitute for our question the question of what they call "confidence" and "guarantees."

They say that our proposals to reduce armaments by one-third and to proclaim the employment of the atomic bomb a crime and the government that first employs it a war criminal, will be a dead letter if not backed by action, and that for action guarantees are needed—that

there must be guaranteed confidence that these proposals will really be put into effect.

That is, they reduce the whole question to one of defining the degree of confidence and the form it shall take; in a word, to substituting the question of confidence for the question of, say, prohibiting the atomic bomb. They forget, however, that in order that there may be confidence, there must be some practical action, some practical measures, to serve as a basis for confidence. Confidence must be ensured—this is the demand that is put forward as a preliminary condition for the acceptance of the proposals submitted by the Soviet Union.

I must point out that this is an old tried and tested method of avoiding, under some pious excuse, examination of questions which we submit for examination and decision, and that this method has already quite a long history, of at least a quarter of a century. This method has been practised time and again by such fencers in the international arena as Chamberlain, Henderson, Paul-Boncour, Clemenceau and Briand—those past masters in the art of substituting one question for another.

It is not by chance that this same question of confidence, which was raised thirty years ago in League of Nations circles, has not been settled to this day. But, on the other hand, the raising of this question has succeeded time and again in squelching important questions of international cooperation, disarmament—general or partial—reduction of armaments, pacts of nonaggression and many another measure designed to avert the threat of war and safeguard the security of nations.

I would remind you that at least twenty-five years ago the Soviet Union encountered this same reservation, this same "preliminary condition" for the elaboration of measures of collective security, as is now being advanced with the same intention in the discussion of the draft Declaration we have submitted.

When we first put forward our proposals for reduction of armaments, for disarmament, the representatives of Britain and France, who, as you know, at that time played the leading part in European affairs, as well as the U.S. representatives, who supported them, tried to block these proposals by advancing the formula: "first security, then disarmament." It has now been slightly changed; it is now said: "first confidence, then reduction of armaments, then prohibition of the atomic weapon." The words have changed, their meaning remains the same.

Speaking at the plenary meeting of the General Assembly in connection with this same formula—"first security, then disarmament"—Mr. Bevin declared that the British Government was following the course it had followed ever since the thirties, when, he said, the Foreign Office was headed by one of his predecessors, Arthur Henderson, who Mr. Bevin alleges strove very hard for disarmament.

This does not conform to the historical record, because Henderson fully supported Paul-Boncour. It was Henderson that was the author of the formula: "There must be a guarantee of security before there can be any talk of disarmament." As we know, at that time the British delegation did everything it could to secure the rejection of the Soviet Government's disarmament proposals. But Mr. Bevin said nothing about a circumstance of which I should like to remind him, namely, that even Arthur Henderson, in spite of all his resistance to disarmament, which in his opinion would have to be preceded by a guarantee of security—could not help admitting, and saying, that substantial disarmament would in itself mean a great deal for security, and, hence, for the strengthening of confidence, and that it might therefore be a guarantee of confidence.

Unfortunately, in this respect Mr. Bevin has not followed in the footsteps of his predecessor, as he called Mr.

Arthur Henderson, and still remains faithful to Paul-Boncour's formula. But that is his business.

My business is to point out that, in spite of the long interval of time that has elapsed since then, the position of Great Britain on this question has remained unaltered.

Speaking of the U.S.S.R. proposals regarding the prohibition of the atomic weapon, Mr. Bevin, adhering to the same position of which I have just spoken, said: "If we consider in the first instance atomic weapons, the point of dispute between us is extremely simple. As I said at the U.N. Assembly in Paris"—Mr. Bevin added—"it is all a question of confidence."

Hence, Mr. Bevin refers us back to his speeches at the Paris session in 1948. But in those speeches there was nothing but one general phrase—"a feeling of security and confidence alone would lead to disarmament." This phrase was obviously formulated in haste, because a feeling of security alone cannot lead to disarmament, all the more that Mr. Bevin should have recalled his predecessor, Mr. Henderson, who had said, on the contrary, that disarmament might lead to security. That is more to the point. That I consider really correct.

But it would be fair to ask Mr. Bevin and those who share his views, what is preventing this feeling of security and confidence? If Mr. Bevin says that it is all very simple, that all that is necessary is to acquire a feeling of confidence, then I ask, what is preventing this feeling of confidence, and what must be done—this is my second question—so that this feeling may at last become as strong as is required, at least by the British Government, in order to pronounce in favour of reducing armaments and prohibiting the atomic bomb? Mr. Bevin, evidently addressing himself to our delegation, said that one must not close one's doors and windows and pull down the blinds so that nobody could look through the doors and

windows, because in that case, he said, it was "impossible to get a firm basis for the establishment of confidence."

If one turns from his metaphorical expressions to practical questions—which, after all, interest us most, and I think have an exceptional interest—then it may be said that "opening all the doors and windows and lifting the blinds and making it possible to look through these doors and windows" means, in application to the problem of banning the atomic weapon, establishing an international control organ which would be able to see and hear and touch and feel what is being done in observance of this ban of the atomic bomb—which perhaps some day we here shall unanimously proclaim. I should like to believe that!

Hence the point at issue is an international control organ, the rights of that organ and the extent of its powers of control. Now, if this problem is solved, it will evidently be possible, according to Bevin, to say that a firm basis for the establishment of confidence has been created, that confidence has been established.

Very well, let us accept this point of view for the moment. How do matters really stand in this respect, with regard to this control organization, so that one might be able to say: "the doors are open, the windows are open, the blinds have been lifted, now look, feel, judge and acquire a feeling of confidence." It is necessary here to revert, at least in a few words, to the history of this question, and this it is incumbent upon me to do.

Three years ago, on June 11, 1947, the Soviet Union submitted to the Atomic Energy Commission a document which plainly stated that measures of control and inspection must be adopted, and which indicated precisely what these measures should be. It envisaged the possibility of carrying out *all measures of inspection* that the Atomic Energy Commission may decide to be necessary. In car-

rying out the inspection of atomic energy facilities, the international control authority should, according to our project, undertake the following measures:

1) Investigate the activities of facilities for mining atómic raw materials and for atomic energy, and check their accounts.

This would be the first right of the international inspectorate, which would act under the direction of the international control authority, and which, of course, would have no connection with the government of any country subscribing to the convention.

2) Check existing stocks of atomic raw materials, atomic materials, and unfinished products.

3) Study production operations to the extent necessary for the control of the use of atomic materials and atomic energy.

4) Observe the fulfilment of the rules of technical exploitation of the facilities prescribed by the convention on control, and work out and prescribe the rules of technological control of such facilities.

5) Collect and analyze data on the mining of atomic raw materials and on the production of atomic materials and atomic energy, etc., etc.

All this is stated black on white in the document dated June 11, 1947. More, this document raises and answers the question of what is to be done in the case of possible violations of the convention and, hence, what is to be done to prevent such violations. The Soviet Union's answer to this question is that the inspectorate, acting under the direction of the international control authority, should carry out special investigations in cases when suspicion of violations of the convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons arises. If the suspicion should arise that somewhere, in some country or other, the convention on the production of atomic energy was being violated, the commission would have full right to carry out a special

investigation. Furthermore, as was subsequently elucidated in a reply to specific questions put by the British representative, Cadogan, on August 11, 1947, and August 16, 1949, what was meant was that these investigations would be carried out by the international control authority on the decision of the Atomic Energy Commission, and, moreover, that the Commission's decisions would not require a unanimous vote, but a majority—the decisions would be adopted by an ordinary majority, and not on the principle of unanimity.

Consequently, the international control authority would have full right to carry out any investigation it thought necessary because of suspicion having arisen, which might be based on reports received by the international control authority, or might have been conceived by the authority independently. This too is expressly stated in our documents.

If there is any suspicion of violation of the convention, then, this document of June 11, 1947, specifically says, the inspectorate shall "submit recommendations for the consideration of the Security Council on measures in regard to violators of the conventions on the prohibition of atomic weapons and on the control of atomic energy."

Our critics demand that all facilities should be granted for checking what is going on at the atomic plants. But as the documents I have just quoted show, in the proposals which we submitted to the Atomic Energy Commission already three years ago, it is stated black on white that the international control authority shall have the right to dispatch inspectors wherever cause for suspicion may arise, and to carry out a thorough and complete investigation on the decision of the international control authority.

I want to say, in addition, that in these documents it is stated that the international control authority shall have the right of:

(a) Access to any facilities for mining, production, and stockpiling of atomic raw materials and atomic materials, as well as to the facilities for the exploitation of atomic energy;

(b) Acquaintance with the production operations of the atomic energy facilities, to the extent necessary for the control of the use of atomic materials and atomic energy;

(c) Carrying out weighing, measurements, and various analyses of atomic raw materials, atomic materials, and unfinished products;

(d) Requesting from the government of any nation, and checking, various data and reports on the activities of atomic energy facilities.

All this, I repeat, is stated precisely, clearly, definitely, without any equivocation or any ambiguity, in the document submitted by our Government on June 11, 1947, and in the letter written on September 5 of that year by the U.S.S.R. representative on the Atomic Energy Commission in reply to the questions, or enquiries made on August 11, 1947, by Mr. Cadogan, who was the permanent British representative on the Atomic Energy Commission at that time. It follows that the freedom of inspection Bevin demands of us is already there. The doors and windows are open, the blinds are lifted, and all that remains is that those who want to look through the windows, the doors and the lifted blinds should remove the blinds from their own eyes and acquire an elementary, I would not say feeling of confidence, but sense of decency.

After these facts, all the rest, of course—all the objections, all the insinuations, all the talk about lack of confidence and about something still having to be proved—I am certain will be regarded by every unbiased and reasonable person as nothing but hollow excuses, as evidences of a desire to conceal, with the help of these excuses, an actual unwillingness to arrive at any agreement for

the organization of real international control of atomic energy, an unwillingness dictated by different aims from those of promoting peace and cooperation. In spite of all the facts I have mentioned, we are having the same old talk about confidence and lack of confidence, the same criticism of the Soviet plan of control, criticism devoid of all foundation. Yet the Soviet plan for international control, in which inspection is the central factor, fully corresponds to the task. This has to be admitted even by such inveterate enemies of the Soviet Union as Mr. Blackburn, British Member of Parliament, who, speaking on this subject in the House of Commons in March of this year, himself said: "I speak as a very strongly anti-Soviet Member of this side of the House, as I think my Hon. Friends will agree." Well, this "very strongly," on his own admission, anti-Soviet-minded member of the House of Commons declared in the British Parliament that the Soviet Union (I quote the published statement, I have the English text at hand) "has gone much further in the direction of cooperation in the field of atomic energy than most people appear to realize." Blackburn was referring precisely to the Soviet Union's proposals of June 11, 1947, and, in spite of his political views, he had the scrupulousness and courage to declare:

"There are also in the Soviet proposals provisions for what I might describe as snap inspections; that is to say, provided reasonable cause was shown by any power, under the Soviet proposals it would be possible for the international inspectors to go and inspect factories without prior specific notice having been given to the power in question."

And what is being put up in opposition to our plan, which meets with the approval of Blackburn, who is our political opponent, but who apparently is also a man who realizes what calamities an atomic or hydrogen war hold in store—what this must mean for all mankind, irrespec-

tive of political views, irrespective of political or religious convictions, irrespective of what political and social system exists in this state or that? Mr. Blackburn realizes what the employment of the atomic bomb would mean for humanity, especially when not only one side has this weapon, but its adversaries have it too.

What, then, is being put up in opposition to our plan? Always the same old Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal plan, the real purpose of which was correctly defined by the well-known British physicist, Dr. Bernal, when in an article in a British journal some time ago he literally said the following: "The United States and British governments only cling to this plan as a means of stalling off any kind of restriction on bomb manufacture."

Did we not at the previous session quote such documents as the letter of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission—documents in which it was stated that the plan of so-called international control drawn up by the Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal commission by no means envisaged discontinuance of the manufacture of atomic weapons?

As to control, which according to the American plan is to be brought into operation by a so-called system of stages—you all remember and are familiar with this—this plan, Dr. Bernal intimates, can only serve as a hindrance to projects for the peaceful utilization of atomic energy, especially by countries which need atomic energy for peaceful, economic and industrial development, like the Soviet Union, for instance.

It should be borne in mind that the United States of America has absolutely no need at all to utilize atomic energy for peaceful, economic purposes, since it possesses other sources of power—coal, oil, timber—in sufficient quantities to run its industries, and to extract large profits through the industries that employ existing sources of fuel. The reconstruction of these industries for the use of atomic energy would entail huge new investments,

which would of course reduce revenues and profits, and this is by no means to the interest of industries run on capitalist lines.

I shall refrain from a more detailed examination of this question until the General Assembly comes to examine the question of atomic energy. I deemed it necessary to mention it at this juncture only that the attitude of the various states to this important question might be clear. I deemed it necessary to say what exactly we have in mind when we devote a special paragraph in the Declaration to expressing our common will and determination to prohibit the employment of the atomic weapon and to brand as a war criminal the first government that ventures to employ it.

As regards our proposal to reduce armaments and armed forces by one-third, the Soviet delegation considers that the objections to this proposal which we have already heard at this session, during the general discussion in the General Assembly, and at previous sessions, cannot be taken seriously.

It is said—and this is one of the major objections—that such reduction would obviously place countries with different military potentials in unequal positions. It is said that, before proceeding to a one-third reduction, armed forces should at least be equalized in some way, so that no party should have an advantage in armed forces—the Soviet Union being, of course, at once held up as such a party.

It is said that, under existing conditions, such a reduction would be sensitively felt by countries with smaller military potentials, and would mean nothing at all to countries with bigger military potentials.

Mr. Bevin even tried to wax ironical on this score, declaring that this proposal made it look "as though this talk of peace and signing petitions and peace campaigns is really a kind of propaganda barrage to weaken the

victim before launching the attack." What does this argument of Mr. Bevin's mean in plain language? It means that in proposing a one-third reduction of armaments, the Soviet Union is out to weaken its future victim of attack. But what basis is there for such an assumption, in view of the policy I have spoken about here, and to which you can oppose nothing except fabrications about Soviet "colonialism" "Red imperialism," and the like. And this at a time when it is not we, but you that are maintaining huge numbers of soldiers in other countries, you that are waging war against peoples in various countries—in Malaya, in Viet-Nam and in Korea—and you that are preparing to start something in China, seizing Taiwan from her under the pretext of establishing United Nations trusteeship—you that want to snatch at least this part of the inalienable territory of the Chinese people.

And all this is put forward as proof of peaceful policy. Yet it is in our country that the work of peaceful construction is really going on, it is in our country that there is not the least hint of a belligerent spirit or of military preparations. Our respected critics would do well to read the article in the *New York Times* from its Moscow correspondent, Salisbury, which tells of the vast scope of civil construction in Moscow and the U.S.S.R. generally, where gigantic hydroelectric stations are being built, exceeding in capacity the most powerful in the world. Here, in the U.S.A., on the other hand, the whole life of its leading circles is dominated by a bellicose spirit, is dominated by belligerent designs, is literally obsessed by a war psychosis.

I would say that here, too, Bevin displayed no originality or resourcefulness. The only originality he displayed was in another remark of his. You no doubt recall that Bevin said in the Assembly that before reducing armed forces, the fifth columns must be withdrawn from Britain and from the other Western countries of the "free

peoples," as he called them. So it appears that the army in Britain cannot be reduced because it is needed for internal use, and not for the defence of frontiers.

Thus even this one original argument which Mr. Bevin put forward bears no relation, it seems to me, to the matter we have in hand. We are proposing a reduction of the armaments and armed forces of the five Great Powers as a *first step*, which may and should be followed by other steps in the same direction.

I want to say, in passing, that in our Declaration, which has been distributed as a document of our committee, we have one amendment to make. The Declaration should read: reducing armed forces by one-third in the course of 1950-51, and not in the course of 1950, as it says in the text.

Hence all this talk about military potential is, in our view, unwarranted and trumped-up, all the more since one must look at things as they really are. And what is the real position with regard to this military potential, well, if only of the five permanent members of the Security Council?

I should like to draw your attention to a recent article by a big military expert, Baldwin, which appeared in *New York Times Magazine*. In it, he presents a balance sheet of America's armed forces and gives a clear idea of America's military potential. It may be seen from this article that the leaders of the North-Atlantic pact by no means underrate the military potential of the countries belonging to this bloc, to say nothing of the big, although absolutely unfounded, hopes they repose in the armed forces of this bloc, stressing, as they have done all along, its superiority, especially with regard to atomic armament.

At any rate, the fact is that though some of the countries of this bloc have attained a very high military potential, as may be seen from the data cited in this article, a frantic armament drive is continuing in these countries

and monstrous sums are being allocated for armaments. The United States alone assigned over thirteen billion dollars for military purposes in 1949/50 compared with a little over one billion dollars in prewar 1938/39, which represents a twelvefold increase; in the 1950/51 fiscal year, the U.S.A. intends to spend about fifty billion dollars, which is nearly fifty times more than in 1938/39. At the same time, the U.S.A. plans to further increase its army, navy and air force from 1.5 million to 3 million men, as U.S. President Truman declared on September 1, intimating, moreover, that if need be the armed forces would be increased still further.

We know that the U.S.A. is at present maintaining in foreign countries hundreds of thousands of men and officers, who have been torn from their peaceful pursuits and their families and been condemned to all the perils of war. We know that there are hundreds of American air bases scattered all over the world. We know that the U.S.A. is intensively mobilizing strategical raw materials and resources and frantically piling up armaments.

A number of authoritative American political leaders, U.S. Vice-President Barkley is one of them, are openly saying that the U.S. must maintain armed forces throughout the world and "may have to occupy more countries before the cold war ends."

This war fever is exceedingly advantageous to the American monopolies, which are raking in vast profits on military contracts. There are figures showing that the aggregate profits of 450 of the biggest U.S. monopoly corporations in the second quarter of this year were 43 per cent higher than in the second quarter of last year.

As to the attitude of U.S. ruling circles to the solution of the atomic problem, to which Mr. Acheson referred in his address, this too is entirely dominated by the interests of the monopolies, whose efforts are directed towards expanding the atomic industry and to securing ever larger

appropriations for the manufacture of atomic weapons and for research on the hydrogen bomb. Everything is being done to turn this branch of war industry into a billion-dollar affair, to make it, as one American magazine put it, the biggest new industry in the United States, a regular "Big Business." It is not for nothing that investments in the manufacture of the atomic bomb already amount to nearly five billion dollars, while the work on the hydrogen bomb has attained a level of annual expenditure exceeding one billion dollars.

All this goes to the enrichment of the atom trusts, the suppliers of military equipment and the materials for the atomic industries. And the explanation is that U.S. ruling circles are literally obsessed by a war fever, are in a state of war trance, of war psychosis. Yet the countries which are spending less for military purposes than in previous years are accused of plotting against peace, while in the country where billions, fifty times the prewar figure, are being spent for military purposes, there, we are told, the one thought is of how to promote peace. Nobody can agree with this strange logic.

The U.S.A. has no interest in utilizing atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

Dr. Bernal says in an interesting article, "The Atom—For War or Peace?" that "in fact the use of atomic energy for peace in the United States hardly exists except for a few grams of tracer material that is grudgingly spared for biological and medical purposes." The leaning of the American plan for so-called international control toward war needs conforms with the basic trend of American foreign policy. This leaning also explains why the Baruch-Lilienthal plan disregards the economic peculiarities and difficulties of economic development of individual countries. This is one of the sources of disagreement between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. over the atomic question.

The proposal to make atomic facilities the property of the so-called international control authority is one of the chief obstacles to agreement regarding international control for the enforcement of the ban on the utilization of atomic energy for military purposes. In spite of the utter unacceptability of the Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal plan, which constitutes the basis of the American plan of so-called international control, neither the U.S.A. nor Great Britain evidently intend to revise this plan. Mr. Acheson's statement at the General Assembly to the effect that the U.S.A. would continue to give consideration to any other proposals is of no serious significance, inasmuch as Acheson made the reservation that this only applied to proposals which would, as he put it, "equally or more effectively accomplish this purpose." In other words, the Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal plan is regarded as the most effective solution of the problem of utilization of atomic energy.

The Soviet Government has already made repeated efforts—and it is prepared to make similar efforts in future, all the necessary efforts—to solve this atomic problem, to secure the banning of the atomic weapon and the establishment of real and effective international control to enforce the ban, so that it may not be infringed or evaded.

As a first step towards this, the Soviet delegation proposes the adoption of a Declaration which, in reference to the atomic weapon, says:

"Considering the employment of the atomic weapon, as a weapon of aggression and mass destruction of human beings, to be contrary to the conscience and honour of nations and incompatible with membership in the United Nations Organization, the General Assembly *proclaims* the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and the institution of strict international control to ensure the rigid and unconditional enforcement of the ban."

I want to stress that this Declaration *proclaims*, affirms the resolve, the determination—and indeed such a Declaration will be of moral value.

The General Assembly furthermore *proclaims*—I again stress this word—that "the first government to employ against any country the atomic or any other weapon for the mass destruction of human beings will be guilty of a crime against humanity and will be treated as a war criminal."

This is the demand of all the peoples of the world. Beneath this demand stand the signatures of five hundred million persons, and despite the terrorism and intimidation practised in certain countries against the peace supporters, the ranks of the champions of peace are growing from day to day. In these ranks stand very many of the world's eminent figures: eminent scientists, writers, artists, members of parliaments and legislative chambers of many countries, prominent public and political figures, thousands of clergymen, farmers, workers and intellectuals.

All classes of society, all sections of the people are daily advancing from their ranks new devoted partisans of peace, fighters for peace.

One cannot help quoting the American atomic scientist who said that "the future will not lie with the country that produces the most atomic and hydrogen bombs, but with that country which first uses atomic energy for the peaceful advance of its people. I suspect that the Soviet people are already doing that. If the United States does not match that achievement, its political prestige in the world will be nil."

Nor can one help citing the letter recently addressed by French intellectuals to our Organization—(it was probably not distributed at the time; I, at least, do not find it in my documents, and I would request our honourable Chairman to see to it that this letter is distributed among

the delegations on our committee)—protesting against employment of the atomic bomb. Among the signatories to this letter we find the names of the eminent French scientists Joliot-Curie, Nobel Prize recipient, and Mauguin, Member of the French Academy, eminent Sorbonne professors and other prominent French intellectuals.

That is why I take the liberty of asserting that our proposal to proclaim the atomic bomb a prohibited weapon and to proclaim any government that first ventures to employ it a war criminal, voices the conscience of the peoples of the world, who have contributed 500 million signatures to the Stockholm Appeal, which some are so loath to recall when they talk on this subject, but which exists and which has inscribed the name of Stockholm in the annals of history in indelible letters.

This proposal is of exceptional importance in the matter of eliminating the menace of war and strengthening peace.

The Soviet Government reasserts its firm determination to secure the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon. It stands, and has always stood, for this demand; it stands, and has always stood, for the establishment of strict and effective international control capable of preventing the use of atomic energy for war purposes. We stand, have stood and will stand by this position, confident that with every day the supporters of such proposals will increase, for the number of partisans of peace is increasing and will continue to increase, because the peoples yearn for peace and detest war.

The enemies of peace make wide use of the press, the radio and the cinema in their propaganda for a new war, and systematically poison the minds of millions with this venomous propaganda. Whoever really wants peace cannot reconcile himself to this shameful fact. No excuses or references to the impermissibility of restricting freedom of speech and the press by forbidding propaganda for an-

other war can be taken into account. All such excuses must be vigorously repudiated as entirely baseless. Yet this propaganda still continues, and in some countries it is even increasing in dimensions and scale.

One cannot, for example, overlook the statements of such instigators of another war as U.S. Secretary of the Navy Matthews, who said that "we should be willing to pay any price, even the price of instituting a war to compel cooperation for peace." This disgraceful utterance, I think, needs no comment.

One cannot overlook such statements as that of British M.P. Wyatt, who demanded that "once and for all we must do away with all the cant that we talk about banning the atom bomb"; or the statement of former U.S. Secretary of Defence Johnson, who has repeatedly taken the initiative in demanding bigger armaments, particularly the production of atomic and bacteriological weapons; one cannot overlook such statements as that of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Bradley, who in his public utterances systematically indulges in slanderous allegations against the Soviet Union and calls for increased armaments and preparation of another war.

Mention should also be made of MacArthur's message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars which likewise contained frank plans of seizure with regard to China, Taiwan, which MacArthur called an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" and an American submarine tender, and with regard to the entire Pacific—that "vast moat," according to MacArthur, and "protective shield to all the Americas."

The Soviet Government considers that this unceasing propaganda for another war and cynical incitement to attack on other countries, to seizure of their territories and violation of their territorial integrity and political independence, are incompatible with the principles, aims and objects of the United Nations, and that it is the duty of the General Assembly to exert its influence to see to

it that this propaganda is stopped. This is all the more the duty of the General Assembly because war propaganda has been condemned in a General Assembly resolution, which recommended the governments of all members of the Organization to take measures to encourage peace propaganda, with the aim of promoting and developing friendly relations among all nations.

I cannot refrain also from recalling the speech made by Dulles at International House in New York, on May 16 of this year, in which he said that "we do not need more international committees which are merely new places to talk or new hurdles in the path of action." This was a direct hint at the United Nations—it directly follows from this statement, because the United Nations prevents Dulles and his confederates from acting in the direction I have already spoken of: in the direction of implementing America's aggressive foreign policy. "In the military field," Dulles said, "we need a supreme allied command." These are the hills unto which are lifted the eyes of this "man of peace," of this man whom somebody here described as a "most meek Christian."

At previous sessions we already mentioned the names of certain instigators of a new war, among them the name of Churchill, who is still not desisting, and of Vansittart, who is likewise not desisting and is continuing his insidious propaganda for another war, intimidating, frightening and calling in to his aid all the horrors that are allegedly being plotted behind the iron curtain—which no more exists than all these horrors themselves exist.

Our draft Declaration proceeds from the need to strengthen peace, and it takes account of the special responsibility of the permanent members of the Security Council, of the Security Council's chief responsibility and the responsibility of all the members of our Organization, for one is inseparably connected with the other.

Our Declaration proposes that the General Assembly shall express the desire to these five Powers that they unite their efforts for peace and conclude among themselves a Pact for the Strengthening of Peace.

This we said last year, and we say it now, because it is demanded by the vital interests of all humanity.

There is no necessity, Mr. Chairman and delegates, to stress the exceptional importance of this proposal. Its acceptance would strike a decisive blow at all aggressive undertakings, at all the plans of the instigators of another war, and would in the highest degree promote the peace and security of nations.

And it is this that the Soviet Union delegation appeals to all the other delegations to do.

Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics